Commentary: An investigation targeted on the Korean War during the escalation of the U.S and China conflicts in 1951, thus to reflect on the U.S Foreign Relations.
More than 60 years have passed since the end of the Korean War during the period of 1950-1953. Historians call it the Forgotten War. While it develops questions in the international arena of the world politics and history in the 20th century, Korean War and the Two Koreas have remained unresolved problems of the war until today in the 21st century. Questions relate the Foreign Relations of the United States since 1945 onward. Whether the Korean War is the civil war with domestic issues or motive for big countries spread powers, a million lives were taken away and the war ended in a stalemate with the line demarcating two Koreas into South and North Korea with the current mournful desire of the re-union and a unified Korea.
This paper investigates right at the time of the war escalation in 1951 after the massive intervention of the Chinese military into the Korean War in late 1950. This is to reflect on the United States foreign policies in 1951 with strategic implications through the Korean War and the establishment of the U.S containment toward the Soviet Union and China under the administrations of McArthur, Truman, Acheson, McCarthy, and Eisenhower, those are “hinged on outsized personalities” of the U.S throughout the Korean War.[1] In this understanding, the confrontation of the two antagonists between the Communist blocs and the anti-Communist Allies under the two directive superpowers of China and the U.S respectively will be given a considerable interpretation in order to demonstrate the public indifference policy of the U.S employed as strategic reactions with China. To the extent, it stirred passions for a superpower competition in three ways: anticommunism reassertion, strategic implications of war and the stakes, and the consequences of the public indifference policy toward civilian sufferings will be concluded as an open question.
Entering the prospect of the Cold War during 1947-1953 is essential. East-West ideological differences, opposing conceptions of politics, mutual distrust and misunderstanding are words that manifest the situations of this Cold War context. The tensions continued because the Soviet embraced to spread the new brand of communism and America began to set the expansive foreign policy and military apparatus to contain the Soviets and its stakes.[2] However, the Soviet’s atomic weapon test in 1949 and their grip walled off Eastern Europe to protect it from Western influences. Therefore 1949 can be seen as a critical year in the development of the Cold War. Besides, the end of the Berlin Blockade at which the Soviet blocked the access of the West to support to the sectors of Berlin,[3] subsequently it led to the permanent division of Germany.
It also witnessed the “loss” of China to the Communist on October 1, 1949; Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong declared the creation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).[4] Heuristically, the loss of the American atomic monopoly after the Soviet’s atomic test and the beginning of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization founded to establish the military security bloc against the Soviet Union.[5] A vast majority of these historical backlashes underscored the apparent need for a throwback of resisting the communist expansion. Thus, it hereby covered the spectrum of the Cold War and the juxtaposition of the Korean War right then during 1950-1953 because of the Chinese intervention in North Korea.
First is the anticommunism. It is worth exploring the Korean War in this aspect due to the contradiction of political ideology of the East and the West, from which the U.S sees a reassertion of anticommunism as a core task of the cultural fixation in America itself and amongst its Allies with the Others in the U.S foreign relations policy. Who is being anti? A clear answer is Sino-Soviet Communists. However, questions of why it led the Korean War and the sufferings of millions of civilians’ deaths have importantly majored. The Korean War loomed largely in 1950 but it actually occurred in 1951.
One of the biggest questions should never be replicated is why were the presences the U.S and China in Korea? Firstly, a scenario was made as to the surrender of the Japanese troops on 15 August 1945 at the end of World War II. Japanese troops in Korea North of the 38th parallel should surrender to the Soviet troops and those South of the 38th parallel should surrender to the US troops. Eventually, the Republic of Korea was set up in the southern part of Korea with the support of the United States and Syngman Ree became its president. While the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was established in the northern part of Korea and Kim Il Sung became the Premier of the Cabinet. At this juncture, Korea was officially split into north and south, but both sides did not give up the goal of reunification. There were conflicts every now and then in areas near the 38th parallel which eventually led to the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June, 1950.[6] In a real prediction, the North is now belonging to the administration of Communist China; while the South belongs to the administration of the U.S. However, both of the antagonists seem to seek reasonable actions to kick-start wars. Back to the explanation above after the “loss” of China, and China now has a full thrive of making their communist brand with the support of the Soviet.
Therefore, Mao Zedong confidently sent troops to intervene in the Korean conflicts. Most Chinese military historians and many more in America concerned this intervention and the legitimacy of a foreign country to interfere with another nation’s issues that they condemn Mao for “gross misjudgements and an idiosyncratic audacity that costs the lives of hundreds of thousands of Chinese soldiers.” While others claim this series of action are “rational, correct and necessary to secure its north-eastern borders, to protect the Sino-Soviet relations, and to save the North Korean regime.”[7] However, on 5 November 1951 the United Nations passed a Resolution calling on the People’s Republic of China to cease all hostilities on the Korean peninsula, and affirmed “the determination of the United Nations to continue its actions in Korea to meet the aggression.”[8] In this resolution, the United Nation also authorise two sides to lend assistance to the United Nation actions in Korea. Adversely, the United States was undertaking the major military operation, and Truman explained that this is “to enforce a United Nations resolution calling for an end to hostilities, and to stem the spread of communism in Asia.”[9] Therefore, the Korean War is unavoidable.
Second, are the strategic implications of war and the stakes. Because of the declaration of war in Korea, no matter what the historical events that the wars and the conflicts targeted, a bloody war, aggressive tactics, and contemplation of the use of the nuclear weapon in this peninsula. On the one hand, the Ongjin Peninsula and Cumings use three mosaics to explain the origins of the war. The first mosaic is the American/South Korean official view that there was a secretly planned launched by the Soviet Union and North Korea, thus unprovoked attack. The second is “the South provoked the war.” The third is the North Korean view that the South launched a surprise invasion against the North. However, in an analysis, Kim supposed that “Cumings expresses ‘considerable doubt’ about the first mosaic and dismisses the third as North Korean propaganda.”[10] From that perspective, Cumings in an assumption claimed that the U.S foreign policy crossed the red line in the intervening the Korean War. Notwithstanding, it is not to investigate the role of a kick-starter to the war for both the U.S and China. To continue the analysis on the U.S foreign policy, it is remarkable to reflect the Truman Doctrine 1947 at the moment. In this document, Truman stated that “the United States earnestly desires peace and is willing to make a vigorous effort to help create conditions of peace.” [11]
Although it was a doctrine to submit to the Congress, the details of the President’s words were not being able to testify. It would mean so many ways for the term “a vigorous effort” to be clearly understood in the U.S foreign relations and thus the policies. Moreover, in a Radio Report to the American People on Korea and on U.S. Policy in the Far East on 11 April 1951, Truman tried to strain the public and blamed the Kremlin for controlling Asia under communism, and supposed the U.S actions are “difficult and bitter doing tasks.”[12] Also, he stated that “It is right for us to be in Korea now. It was right last June. It is right today.”[13] The schedule seems to be projected and the tensions are unavoidable in the making of war that it was intended by the U.S too. On the other hand, the U.S has failed its atomic weapon monopoly in 1949. So the Korean War can be their opportunity to use it and claim victory. However, there was no use of the nuclear weapon in this peninsula. Commenting on this point, Daniel assumed that “Truman’s war aim was a return to the status quo antebellum and planned to repel the aggression, to put the Communists out of the South, and was prepared to leave the re-unification of Korea for a future political scenario.” [14] In comparison, on January 27 1951, in the telegram from Mao Zedong to Stalin, conveying Ambassador Peng Dehuai discussion regarding the results of a meeting with Kim Il Sung, including Kim Il Sung’s belief that “the Korean People’s Army cannot defeat the Americans alone, the defence of Korea’s coast, the re-staffing of five corps, and preparations for soldiers to carry out work in the newly liberated areas.”[15]
While on June 27 1951, the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State delivered a message that “Sov Govt unaware attitude “Chinese Govt” and no suggestions as to how views ascertained except “sure that US Govt can find means.”[16] If this as what Truman described is the non-intervention of the Soviet into the political situation of Korea, this is merely physical. The Kremlin can control Asia from the Kremlin and the statement of “the U.S can find means” can be diplomatically but the Soviet cannot run away from the responsibility of the Communist bloc. This demonstrates the clear implications of the wholesale interference from the Communist bloc into the Korean War.
In conclusion, the consequences of the public indifference policy toward civilian sufferings are massive for a nonsense war. The anticommunism and the strategic implications of the war in Korea thus depicted the superpower competition. The deaths of the whole war estimated up to three million lives during the three years of the Korean War.[17] The consequences are reasoned by the attitude of the antagonists toward the war and see civilians with no tolerance. Eventually, the war was “less one of obsession but more negligence: once the war looked like a loser, the American public turned away from its carnage and mainly quibbled over its domestic politics.”[18] The issue of politics, the issue of the spread of communism, the issue of superpower competitions are never tolerant or prioritized beyond the issue of the people – the civilians. We should question that a country like Korea with initially deployed troops and poorly trained. They could not challenge the superpowers for a war. The antagonists should be shameful enough for their actions in a small country with weak economics, hunger, underdevelopment, shouldn’t they? The Korean War through this Volume in 1951 is merely a slice of the truths. The contention may be investigated and made clear at some points. Should this be questioned one more time about the U.S foreign relations and policies lingered from the past to the current world so that there will be no more Forgotten War like the Korean War?
Bibliography
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NOTES:
[1] John Tirman, The Deaths of Others: The Fate of Civilians in American Wars (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 59.
[2] James R. Arnold and Roberta Wiener, Cold War: The Essential Reference Guide (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2012), under “Causes of the Cold War,” https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.ezproxy2.acu.edu.au
[3] “The Blockade of Berlin”, accessed May 9, 2019, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/dbq/berlinblockade.php
[4] “The Chinese Revolution of 1949”, accessed May 9, 2019, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/chinese-rev
[5] “North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949”, accessed May 9, 2019, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/nato
[6] “Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea”, accessed May 9, 2019, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn
[7] Xiaobing Li, China’s Battle for Korea: The 1951 Spring Offensive (Bloomington, IN Indiana University Press, 2014), 1.
[8] “United Nation General Assembly Resolution 498 (V)”, accessed May 9, 2019, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116196
[9] “Truman orders U.S. forces to Korea”, accessed May 9, 2019, https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/truman-orders-u-s-forces-to-korea-2
[10] Youngho Kim, “The origins of the Korean War: Civil war or Stalin’s Rollback?,” Diplomacy and Statecraft, 10:1, 186-214(1999), DOI: 10.1080/09592299908406115
[11] “The Truman Doctrine”, ca. 1952. Truman Papers, President’s Secretary’s Files. Foreign Policy: Greek-Turkish Aid Program (Truman Doctrine)”, accessed May 9, 2019, https://www.trumanlibrary.org
[12] “Radio Report to the American People on Korea and on U.S. Policy in the Far East”, accessed May 9, 2019, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu
[13] Ibid.
[14] Daniel Calingaert, “Nuclear weapons and the Korean War,” Journal Of Strategic Studies 11, no.2 (1988): 177-202, DOI: 10.1080/01402398808437337
[15] Telegram from Mao Zedong to Stalin Conveying the 19 January 1951 Telegram from Peng Dehuai to Mao Zedong Regarding Meetings with Kim Il Sung, accessed May 9, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110020
[16] “The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State”, accessed May 9, 2019, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v07p1/d368
[17] Tirman, “The Korean War,” 59.
[18] Ibid.
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